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"Witelo's use of the mathematical knowledge of his predecessors 
was to a very great extent uncreative" (p. 28)--the first book 
of the Perspectiva does provide insights into the state of mathe- 
matics at the end of the 13th century. For example, Unguru's 
careful analysis of each proposition and search for possible 
sources allow him to establish the likely pool of mathematical 
works available in the Latin West. These include the obvious 
sources that Witelo frequently quotes--Euclid, Apollonius of 
Perga, and Alhazen--as well as other sources that can be identi- 
fied by similarities in arguments--Campanus of Novara's edition 
of and Theon's additions to the Elementa, as well as Eutocius's 
commentary on De sphaera et cylindro. As other likely sources, 
Unguru lists Pappus' Mathematicae colfectfones, in unknown trans- 
lation or in parts; Jordanus's Geometria; Theon's recension of 
Euclid's Optica and Catoptrica; Theodosius's Sphaeris, and Serenus's 
De sectione cylindri. These and other nonmathematical sources 
came to Witelo through the translations of his friend and col- 
league at Viterbo, William of Moerbeke. 
Unguru's edition of the Perspectiva draws principally on 
three manuscripts and the Risner edition, although eight of a 
total of twenty-five manuscripts have been consulted and are 
cited. The translation is careful and stays very close to the 
Latin text, supplying terms and interpolations only when necessary. 
An introductory discussion of the life of Witelo, the circumstances 
surrounding the compilation of the Perspectiva, and its signifi- 
cance round out this book. All in all, it is an important addi- 
tion to the growing collection of textual studies available to 
persons interested in medieval science and this portion of the 
history of mathematics. 
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The major general claim of this book is that the conscious 
goals of Aristotle's treatment of the continuous (to sunech&) 
include the resolution, not only of physical and general philoso- 
phical problems, but also of questions in the foundations of 
mathematics raised by Eudoxus. More specifically, Waschkies 
attempts to give a developmental account of Aristotle's treat- 
ment of the continuous along with a reconstruction of some ideas 
of Eudoxus, and to argue that at a certain point in Aristotle's 
development these ideas make themselves felt. The book's primary 
audience is undoubtedly classical scholars, particularly histori- 
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ans of mathematics and students of Aristotle. The book contains 
many penetrating analyses of particular passages and concepts 
which I shall not discuss here. Rather I shall focus on parts 
of Waschkies' general argument. 
Readers familiar with the developmental approach to the 
study of Aristotle will not be surprised to learn that Waschkies 
dissects texts into chronological layers and attempts to dis- 
tinguish the original form of passages from their later reworking. 
Waschkies is interested only in the early phases of Aristotle's 
career, roughly the period before Plato's death. He uses two 
particular assumptions about this period to rule passages out of 
consideration or treat them as later reworkings: (1) that Aris- 
totle had not yet fully developed the distinction between poten- 
tiality and actuality: (2) that in this period Aristotle thought 
of continuity as applying to spatial objects and not also to 
time and motion, as he later did. Neither of these assumptions 
is clearly true, and the second seems to me particularly un- 
likely, since passages in which spatial objects and time or 
motion are treated together occur throughout Aristotle's works. 
The point I wish to stress, however, is that these assumptions 
lead not only to the elimination or alteration of passages in 
Aristotle's main discussions of continuity (Physics, V,3 and 
VI,11 ; they also take these discussions out of the context in 
which they are preserved for us. For the Physics is the work 
in which Aristotle discusses time and motion, and in which he 
makes heaviest use of the potentiality-actuality distinction. 
Nevertheless, Waschkies usually mentions Aristotle's references 
to these concepts only to dismiss them, and I shall leave the 
concepts out of account in the sequel. 
It is convenient to begin by summarizing the main Aristote- 
lian discussions of continuity. In Ph. V,3 Aristotle defines 
a number of relations between things beginning with "together" 
(hama) and "apart." He then defines contact: 
Things are in contact (haptesthai) if their extremities 
are together (226b23). 
It is to be noticed that this definition does not presuppose that 
things in contact are in any particular serial order, but it does 
presuppose that things in contact have extremities. Aristotle 
next introduces a notion of order with a formally unsatisfactory 
definition of "between". He then defines, 
A thing is in succession (ephexzs) if it is after the 
beginning . . . and there is nothing in the same genus 
between it and what it succeeds, e.g. a line or lines 
if it is a line, a unit or units if it is a unit, or 
a house if it is a house (226b34-227a3). 
A thing is contiguous (echomenon) if it is in succession 
and in contact [with what it succeeds] (227a6-7). 
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Continuity is a kind of contiguity. I say that [con- 
tiguous] things are continuous when the limit of each 
at which they are in contact becomes one and the same 
(227&S12). 
Aristotle cites his definitions to show that continuity is a sub- 
species of contact, and simply asserts that contact is a sub- 
species of succession (227a17-23). It is to be noted that this 
assertion does not follow from the definitions, since neither 
contact nor succession is defined in terms of the other: and, 
insofar as contact does not require an order, one might have 
things in contact with no natural way of deciding which succeeds 
which. On the other hand, it does not seem to me implausible 
to suppose that Aristotle is taking an order for granted and 
making an intuitively correct but formally unjustified inference. 
However, Waschkies argues, on the basis of a passage in the 
Topics (IV,2,122b25-28) in which continuity is said to be a 
species of contact and a passage in Plato's Parmenides (148d- 
149d) in which contact is made a subspecies of succession, that 
Aristotle is here trying to force a correspondence between his 
definitions and a standard Academic view. 
Aristotle ends Ph. V,3 with a curious argument that if 
points and units are separately existing entities, they are not 
identical: 
For contact applies to points, succession to units; 
and there can be something between points (for every 
line is between points), but there is no such neces- 
sity for units; for there is nothing between one and 
two (227a29-32). 
I shall discuss part of this argument subsequently. For now I 
note only that the idea of contact between points seems incom- 
patible with the definition of contact, since points do not 
have extremities. 
In Ph. VI,1 Aristotle refers to his previous definitions of 
continuity, contact, and succession, but recapitulates them 
differently: 
Things of which the extremities are one are continuous, 
things of which the extremities are together are in 
contact, and things between which there is nothing of 
the same genus are in succession (231a22-23). 
For Waschkies the variations in content and order are indications 
that Aristotle is adopting a new perspective. I am inclined 
to think that Aristotle is simply recalling the intuitive picture 
he presented in V,3 by saying that continuity is a subspecies of 
contact, which is a subspecies of succession. In any case Aris- 
totle now draws an important consequence from his definitions: 
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It is impossible for something continuous to be com- 
posed of indivisibles, e.g. a line of points, if a 
line is continuous and a point indivisible. (a) For 
the limits of points are not one; for there is not one 
part of an indivisible which is an extremity and another 
part. (b) Nor are the limits together; for there is no 
limit of a thing without parts, since a limit and that 
of which it is a limit are different (231a24-29). 
It is to be noticed that no direct sense can be made of the 
notion of a continuous line, if one relies on Aristotle's defini- 
tion of continuity, according to which continuity is a relation 
between things like lines. We might well think that a continuous 
thing is one whose components are related by continuity, and 
Waschkies appears to hold this view. For he takes (b), which 
is clearly intended to show that indivisibles can't be in con- 
tact, as an unexpected addition. However, I am inclined to 
think that Aristotle calls a line continuous in an intuitive 
sense, and in VI,1 argues that a line cannot be composed of 
points which are continuous, in contact, or in succession. The 
argument against the last possibility comes eight lines after the 
arguments against the first two: 
Nor can a point be in succession to a point . . . in such 
a way that a length is composed of points.... For things 
between which there is nothing of the same genus are in 
succession, but what is between points is always a line 
. . . (231b6-9). 
Before this argument Aristotle inserts a second argument 
designed to show that the points on a line can neither be con- 
tinuous nor in contact. He refers to his first argument for 
the case of continuity, and then says, 
All things are in contact as whole with whole or as 
part with part or as whole with part. But since the 
indivisible is partless, it is necessarily in'contact 
as whole with whole. But if it is in contact as whole 
with whole, there will be no continuity. For the con- 
tinuous has different parts and is thus divided into 
different and spatially separated parts (231b2-6). 
Here Aristotle allows what is excluded in the preceding argu- 
ment and in the definitions of Ph. V,3, namely, that points 
might be in contact. He argues that such contact can only 
be coincidence and hence cannot yield an extended line. 
The anomaly of the argument of 231b2-6 is a cornerstone of 
Waschkies' theorizing. He sees the argument as a foreign body 
which must have an outside source, namely, Eudoxus. I shall 
discuss Waschkies' theories shortly. Here I shall remark only 
that Aristotle, like many people, frequently uses principles he 
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does not accept to refute views he opposes. The anomaly of 231b 
2-6 may not be as great as Waschkies supposes. 
The final argument in Ph. VI,1 against a continuum's being 
composed of indivisibles is very cumbersome. 
A. [If a continuum could be composed of indivisi- 
bles], it could be divided into indivisibles, if (eiper) 
each thing is divided into that of which it is composed. 
B. But no continuous thing was divisible into in- 
divisibles. 
C. Nor can there be anything of another kind be- 
tween the points...; for if there could be, it is 
clear that it must be either (a) indivisible or (b) 
divisible, and if it is divisible, it must be divisi- 
ble into either (bl) indivisibles or (b2) into things 
which are always divisible. This is the continuous. 
D. But it is clear that every continuum is divi- 
sible into things which are always divisible. 
E. For if it were divisible into indivisibles, 
indivisibles would be in contact with indivisibles; 
for the limit of continuous things is one and in 
contact (231blO-18). 
In B, Aristotle states as an established fact what he has not 
yet shown, but goes on to show in E. E is formulated as an 
argument for the infinite divisibility of continua (D), but 
the argument shows that for Aristotle infinite divisibility 
and nondivisibility into indivisibles are equivalent notions. 
In E, Aristotle refers to his previous arguments against contact 
of indivisibles, and eliminates their being continuous on the 
ground that continuity is a kind of contact. The possibility 
of a continuum's being divided into successive indivisibles not 
in contact might seem to be open, but this possibility is ap- 
parently closed in C. There Aristotle argues that (a) and (bl) 
violate principle B, leaving only (b2) as a possibility, the 
possibility which Aristotle declares to be actual for the con- 
tinuous. 
This kind of odd logical order is not unusual in Aristotle, 
and, if one makes allowances for a certain degree of imprecision, 
the reasoning is sound. However, there are two features of the 
argument which should be made more explicit. The first is 
Aristotle's assumption in A that a thing is divisible into its 
components. Aristotle does not admit the possibility that a 
line might be composed of points but not divisible into them. 
More important is Aristotle's assertion that a continuum is 
infinitely divisible (D). For Waschkies this is the assertion 
that a thing with continuous components is infinitely divisible, 
but I take it that Aristotle is still using an intuitive unde- 
fined notion of a continuum and arguing that it cannot be divided 
into indivisibles which are either continuous or in contact or 
in succession. 
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On either interpretation Aristotle gets into difficulty in 
Ph. VI,2 when he says, 
I call continuous that which is divisible into things 
which are always divisible (232b24-25), 
and infers the continuity of time from its infinite divisibility. 
For, although Aristotle has established that continuous things 
are infinitely divisible, he has not proved, and quite clearly 
could not prove, that infinitely divisible things are continuous. 
Waschkies interprets this situation as showing that Aristotle 
is working with two different definitions of continuity, 
K.l. a is continuous if and only if it is 
infinitely divisible, 
K.2. b is continuous with c if and only if 
they have a common extremity, 
and illegitimately assuming their equivalence. I suggest as an 
alternative interpretation that Aristotle defines a continuum 
(wrongly) in terms of K-1 in Ph. VI.2, having argued in VI,l, 
on the basis of his definitions of the relations "continuous" 
(K.2), "in contact," and "successive," that a continuum (intui- 
tively conceived) is infinitely divisible. I shall not pursue 
this suggestion here, but turn instead to Waschkies' account of 
the complicated texts I have been describing. 
For Waschkies K.l and K.2 are reflections of two different 
traditions taken over by Aristotle. The account of the continuous 
as infinitely divisible goes back to Anaxagoras' reflections on 
the paradoxes of Zeno. Waschkies claims that this account under- 
lies the early "Grundschicht" of Aristotle's treatment of the 
infinite (Ph. 111.4-8). On the other hand, K.2 and the other 
definitions of Ph. V,3 are for Waschkies Aristotle's early 
attempt to come to grips in a fairly precise way with the ques- 
tion "When does a multiplicity of parts constitute a single 
thing?" This philosophical question has its roots in the Eleatic 
conception of being, and was treated by the natural philosophers 
Anaxagoras and Democritus. Of particular importance for Waschkies 
is the claim that in this tradition there was no concern for the 
inner structure (Feinstruktur) of a continuum, or, roughly speak- 
ing, no attempt to be precise about the nature of the parts 
making up a unit. 
Waschkies focuses the question of inner structure in what 
he calls the composition and division problems: Can a continuum 
be composed of indivisibles? In what way or ways can a continuum 
be divided? He argues that Aristotle's concern with inner struc- 
ture in Ph. VI,1 (as opposed to V,3) is an indication of a third 
influence, the mathematical work of Eudoxus. To describe Waschkies 
conception of this influence, it is necessary to describe some 
points from his account of the development of Greek mathematics. 
According to him, Democritus established the volume equality 
206 Reviews HM7 
of pyramids with equal heights and congruent triangular bases 
by imagining them resting in the same plane and using planes 
parallel to their bases to establish a one-one correspondence 
between congruent triangles out of which each pyramid might be 
said to be composed. He then used elementary geometric argu- 
ments to establish that any pyramid has one-third the volume 
of a prism with the same height and base, and a formally 
illegitimate exhaustion argument to establish the corresponding 
result for cones and cylinders. 
The famous cone fragment, in which Democritus asks about 
the equality or inequality of the "surfaces of the segments" 
made by passing a plane through a cone parallel to its base, 
shows that Democritus was in some sense aware of the composition 
problem. However, according to Waschkies, he simply bypassed 
it, and was able to do so because his treatment of pyramids 
with congruent bases required establishing a one-one correspondence 
between the sections made in two pyramids but did not require 
a summation of the sections. Eudoxus, influenced by Zeno, took 
up the composition problem. In Waschkies' view, although Zeno 
himself had asserted that an extended magnitude could not be 
composed of unextended ones, he did not provide logical argumenta- 
tion of thekinda mathematician like Eudoxus would require. 
Waschkies takes over the standard view according to which 
Eudoxus provided the satisfactory proofs of Democritus' theorems 
and related results which we find in book XII of Euclid's 
Elements, and worked out the general theory of proportion which 
is now book V. Waschkies also accepts what seems to be the 
standard account of the development of Greek proportion theory: 
a first stage in which the theory is only applicable to commen- 
surable magnitudes, and a is said to be to b as c to d if and 
only if the Euclidean algorithm applied to the pairs (a,b) and 
(c,d) yields the same numerical expression for the ratios; a 
second, "anthyphairetic" stage in which this is said if and 
only if the algorithm applied to the same pairs yields the same 
(possibly infinite) sequence of integers (i.e., the denominators 
of the expansions of the ratios into continued fractions); and 
a third, Eudoxian stage in which "a is to b as c is to d" means 
that for any integers m and n, m-a and m-c are alike greater than, 
equal to, or less than n-b and n-d. 
Waschkies devotes some time to arguing that Eudoxus was 
the first to formulate 
El. V, def. 4: Magnitudes which when multiplied can 
exceed one another are said to have a ratio to one 
another, 
which Waschkies, like most scholars, takes to-&e an expression 
of the Archimedean condition. Editors customarily point to two 
applications of this definition in the Elements, one in V,8, a 
proposition whose proof can almost certainly be ascribed to 
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Eudoxus, and one in X,1, the assertion that, given two magnitudes, 
subtracting more than half from the greater, more than half from 
what remains, and so on, will eventually produce a magnitude 
smaller than the smaller of the original two magnitudes. This 
latter proposition is immediately applied in X,2, the assertion 
that the Euclidean algorithm yields a common measure if there 
is one, an assertion naturally associated with the anthyphairetic 
theory of ratio; otherwise, X,1 is applied only in book XII. 
Waschkies argues that X,1 was tacitly assumed in the original 
proof of X,2, and found its present position as the result of 
subsequent editorial work. The editor is said to have borrowed 
X,1 from Eudoxus, who had placed it at the beginning of what 
we know as book XII, where it plays a fundamental role. 
Waschkies' account of the relation between the work of Demo- 
critus and that of Eudoxus suggests that Eudoxus might have been 
concerned with the inner structure of continua. But nothing in 
the Elements requires this assumption. In particular, V, def. 
4 may have no connection with either V,8 or X,1 (and hence none 
with book XII); the definition can be interpreted as indicating 
only that incommensurable magnitudes are covered in the theory 
of Book V [l]. 
To buttress his claim that V,def. 4, is related to the 
question of inner structure Waschkies assigns to Eudoxus the 
following definitions from the Elements. 
El.I,def. 1: A point is that which has no parts. 
El.I,def. 2: A line is breadthless length. 
El.I,def. 5: A surface is that which has length 
and breadth only. 
El.XI,def. 1: A solid is that which has length, 
breadth, and depth. 
These definitions are said to form the basis of Eudoxus' argu- 
ment that an n-dimensional thing cannot be a sum of (n - l)- 
dimensional things, an argument which we have already seen at 
Ph. VI,1,231b2-6, and which occurs in different forms in the 
Grundschicht of On Coming to Be and Passing Away, 1,2, and 
most explicitly in On Indivisible Lines. The possible connec- 
tion between these definitions and the argument is clearest in 
the case of the definition of point; for the argument uses the 
partlessness of points to infer coincidence from contact. How- 
ever, it is easy enough to see that the same considerations 
could be used in connection with the definitions of line, surface, 
and solid to argue against a surface's being composed of lines 
or a solid of planes. 
It is now possible to describe in more detail the signs of 
Eudoxian influence which Waschkies finds in Aristotle. This 
influence is already seen in the difficult argument at Ph. V,3, 
227a29-32, where Aristotle says that points can be in contact. 
Aristotle also denies here and again in VI,l, 231336-g that points 
208 Reviews HM7 
can be in succession, on the ground that between distinct points 
there is or can be a straight line. Normally commentators fill 
out this argument by saying that the straight line can be bi- 
sected to yield an intermediate point, but Waschkies takes the 
straight line to be the thing of the same genus as the points. 
Using this argument it is possible to provide a conjectural 
reconstruction of Eudoxus' refutation of the possibility of a 
straight line's being composed of points: either the points are 
in contact and they coincide, or they are not in contact and a 
straight line can be drawn between them. 
Although Ph. V,3 contains traces of Eudoxian influence, for 
Waschkies it stems from a time when Aristotle was not fully 
cognizant of the problem of inner structure. Contact with 
Eudoxus made him aware of this problem, and at a subsequent 
stage, which is clearest in On Coming to Be and Passing Away, 
I,2, he relied heavily on Eudoxus' argument to cope with it. 
Finally, by the time of Ph. VI,1 Aristotle has come to see that 
he can cope with the problem using his own definition of conti- 
nuity, although he also includes some unnecessary Eudoxian argu- 
ments in the chapter as well. 
I turn now to Waschkies' treatment of the division problem, 
a problem which may be broken down into three questions. 
1. Can two lines differ by a point? 
2. Can a line be divided into points? 
3. Where can a line be divided? 
According to Waschkies, the division problem arose in Greek 
mathematics in connection with question 1. In The Quadrature 
of the Parabola Archimedes says that he assumes as a l&nma 
one similar to that assumed by earlier geometers in the proofs 
of certain propositions now found in book XII of the Elements. 
The l&nma asserts that, given three n-dimensional magnitudes, 
the difference between two of them can always be multiplied 
enough times to exceed the third. For Waschkies this assertion 
amounts to a generalization of the statement that the difference 
between two lines is not a point. He suggests that Eudoxus did 
not formulate this assertion as an explicit assumption because 
he believed that he could prove it. 
Waschkies' reconstruction of the proof is based primarily 
on Ph. IV,8, 2151312-20. The proof is based on the assumption that 
the difference between any two n-dimensional magnitudes bears a 
ratio to the greater magnitude and hence to any n-dimensional mag- 
nitude; by El .V,def. 4, this assumption means that if the differ- 
ence between two lines were a point, a sum of points could exceed 
a line, and a fortiori such a sum could be equal to a line; but 
the Eudoxian solution to the composition problem shows this to be 
impossible. Given V,def. 4, the assumption on which this argu- 
ment is based clearly begs the question. Moreover, Archimedes' 
discussion suggests that he considers himself to have uncovered 
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an assumption made tacitly by his predecessors [2]. In the absence 
of any clear evidence that Eudoxus did formulate the argument, I 
am inclined to be skeptical about Waschkies' proposal. 
Aristotle's principal concern is to give a negative answer 
to question 2. We have already seen that he does it in Ph. VI, 
1,231b16-18 by means of the same general strategy which Waschkies 
ascribes to Eudoxus in connection with question 1: reduction to 
the impossibility of a magnitude's being composed of indivisibles. 
Waschkies holds that Aristotle's main purpose in his discussion 
of the division problem in VI,1 is to meld K.l and K.2, and so 
prepare the way for the use of K.l in VI,2. As we have seen, 
Aristotle fails to achieve this purpose. At the end of his 
book Waschkies raises the question whether this failure under- 
mines his view that Aristotle's treatment of continuity is in- 
tended to contribute to the study of mathematical foundations. 
For Waschkies this question reduces to the question whether the 
mathematicians of Aristotle's time could have recognized the 
inadequacy for geometric purposes of the condition that lines 
be infinitely divisible. It is now, of course, a commonplace 
that infinite divisibility corresponds to density, which does 
not yield what we call continuity. Waschkies argues persuasively 
that Aristotle's contemporaries could not have recognized the 
inadequacy, because they took for granted an intuitive answer 
to question 3 according to which a geometric magnitude is divi- 
sible "everywhere" (panGi); Aristotle thinks K.l is a geo- 
metrically satisfactory account of continuity because he takes 
the same intuitive answer for granted. Since his mistake would 
not have been recognized by the mathematicians of his time, 
Waschkies concludes that it cannot be used as evidence against 
his own view that Aristotle was engaged in foundational studies. 
Provided the notion of foundational studies is taken in a 
sufficiently general sense, there seems to me every reason to 
accept this view. For although Waschkies' historical claims 
about Eudoxus, Aristotle's relation to Eudoxus, and Aristotle's 
own intellectual development seem tenuous, Aristotle's treament 
of continuity includes an attempt to analyze the relation be- 
tween mathematical points and lines; moreover, this analysis is 
far and away the most sophisticated and precise to survive 
from antiquity and, to my knowledge, from any time before the 
nineteenth century. Waschkies' careful investigation makes 
clear the significance of this analysis. For such careful 
scholarly work we must be grateful. 
NOTES 
1. I have discussed these questions in Ian Mueller, 1981, 
Philosophy of Mathematics and Deductive Structure in Euclid's 
Elements, Cambridge, Mass. (MIT Press). 
2. This point has been argued for convincingly in M. Dehn, 
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1937, "Beziehungen zwischen der Philosophie und der Grundlagen 
der Mathematik in Alterturn," Quellen und Studien zur Geschichte 
der Mathematik, Astronomie, und Physik, Abteilung B 4, l-28. 
See especially pp. 19-22. 
THE HISTORY OF STATISTICS IN THE 17TH AND 18TH CENTURIES AGAINST 
THE CHANGING BACKGROUND OF INTELLECTUAL, SCIENTIFIC AND 
RELIGIOUS THOUGHT. Lectures by Karl Pearson given at Uni- 
versity College, London, during the academic sessions 1921- 
1933. Edited by E. S. Pearson. New York, Macmillan, 1978. 
xix, 744 pp. 
Reviewed by James H. Cassedy 
National Library of Medicine 
Bethesda, Maryland 
In 1921, at the age of 64, Karl Pearson began a lecture 
course at University College, London, on the history of statis- 
tics. Over the next dozen years, Pearson developed and greatly 
expanded these lectures. He did not attempt to cover the entire 
subject in any one term, but rather each year dealt in depth 
with certain selected aspects or periods. By 1933, however, when 
he retired, he had covered in great detail large portions of 
the history of statistics up through the 19th century. 
Upon Pearson's death in 1936 the manuscripts of these lec- 
tures were found among his papers. Whether or not Pearson him- 
self had earlier modified the manuscripts is not clear. In any 
case, during the next few years Pearson's widow did some arrang- 
ing and editing of the lectures with a view toward their possible 
publication. However, Major Greenwood, Udny Yule, and other 
outside readers strongly advised against publication without 
considerable additional changes and corrections. Now, four de- 
cades later, the lectures have been published by Pearson's son 
as a memorial to his father, somewhat further annotated and 
edited, though presumably not to the extent suggested by Green- 
wood and Yule. 
The result is a very large volume, one that is both less 
and more than the manuscript left by Pearson. On the one hand, 
sizable portions of material have been deleted in the interest 
of saving space. On the other hand, the editor has arranged 
the lectures in broad chronological order, has given a short 
account of their background, has inserted numerous comments of 
his own at various points in his father's text, and has provided 
a name index. The volume comes to us, therefore, as a mixed 
bag, one that is filled with much to admire and instruct, but 
one that also has its weaknesses. 
The idea of having a history of statistics by Karl Pearson 
is an appealing one. It is instructive to see how the biographer 
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